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Abstract The Knowability Paradox is a logical argument showing that if all truths
are knowable in principle, then all truths are, in fact, known. Many strategies have
been suggested in order to avoid the paradoxical conclusion. A family of solutions –
called logical revision – has been proposed to solve the paradox, revising the logic
underneath, with an intuitionistic revision included. In this paper, we focus on so-
called revisionary solutions to the paradox – solutions that put the blame on the
underlying logic. Specifically, we analyse a possibile translation of the paradox into
a modified intuitionistic fragment of a logic for pragmatics (KILP) inspired by Dalla
Pozza and Garola in 1995. Our aim is to understand if KILP is a candidate for the
logical revision of the paradox and to compare it with the standard intuitionistic
solution to the paradox.
1 Introduction
Church-Fitch’s Knowability Paradox shows that from the assumptions that all truths
are knowable and that there is at least an unknown truth (i.e., that we are non-
omniscient) follows the undesirable conclusion that all truths are known. The para-
dox of knowability is considered a problem especially for antirealists on truth.
An antirealist way of answering the criticisms consists in revising logic, assum-
ing (for example) the intuitionistic logic as the right logic, thus blocking the paradox
through the adoption of a revision of the logical framework in which the derivation
is made.
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We take for granted that a revison of the logical framework could be considered
as the right solution to the paradox. Aim of the paper is to analyse if the paradox
is reproducible within a logic for pragmatics (LP), specifically into a modified in-
tuitionistic fragment of a logic for pragmatics (KILP) inspired by Dalla Pozza and
Garola in 1995. The basic idea of the paper is that if some epistemic aspects associ-
ated with the notion of assertion, which are merely implicit in some philosophical
conceptions of intuitionistic logic (on this aspect see Sundholm (1997)), can be ex-
plicated in a proper way in the pragmatic language, then KILP seems to be – at least
prima facie – as good as other logical frameworks for the solution of the knowability
paradox.
The paper is divided into eight sections. Section 2 is devoted to briefly outlining
the structure of the knowability paradox. In Section 3, we sketch the intuionistic
solution to the paradox. Then, an analysis of the difficulties of the intuionistic solu-
tion, specifically the Undecidedness paradox of Knowability, is sketched in Section
4. In Section 5, LP and ILP are introduced. Section 6 deals with an analysis of the
paradox in KILP. Section 7 is devoted to a comparison between our solution and the
intuitionistic one. Some provisional conclusions of the paper are outlined in the last
section.
2 Knowability Paradox
The Knowability Paradox is a proof that, if every truth is knowable, then every truth
is also actually known. Such a paradox is based on two principles: the principle of
knowability and the principle of non-omniscience. The principle of knowability KP
can be expressed in the following way:
(KP) ∀p(p→♦Kp)
while non-omniscience (Non-Om) is formulated as:
(Non-Om) ∃p(p ∧¬K p)
The expression ′K p′ reads“p is, has been or will be known by somebody”. As-
sume the following two properties of knowledge:
1. the distributive property over conjunction (Dist), i.e., if a conjunction is known,
then its conjuncts are also known, and
2. the factivity of knowledge (Fact), i.e., if a proposition is known, then it is true.
Assume the following two unremarkable modal claims, which can be formulated
using the usual modal operators ♦ (“it is possible that”) and 2 (“it is necessary
that”). The first is the Rule of Necessitation:
(Nec) If p is a theorem then 2p
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The second rule establishes the interdefinability of the modal concepts of neces-
sity and possibility:
(ER) 2¬p is logically equivalent to ¬♦p
From KP and Non-Om a contradiction follows. Fitch (1963) and Church (we
follow here Salerno 2009) proved that
(*) ∀p¬♦ K (p∧¬K p )
is a theorem. But if (*) and (Non-Om) hold, then (KP) has to be rejected, since the
substitution of p ∧¬K p for p in (KP) leads to a contradiction.
On the other hand, if (KP) is accepted, then (Non-Om) must be denied. However,
the negation of (Non-Om) is equivalent to the formula asserting that “∀p(p→K p)”.
Therefore, from (KP) it follows that every sentence is known and this fact seems
to be particularly problematic for the holders of antirealism who accept (KP). This
argumentation shows that in the presence of (relatively unproblematic) principles
(Dist) and (Fact), the thesis that all truths are knowable (KP) entails that all truths are
known. Since the latter thesis is clearly unacceptable, the former must be rejected.
We must conclude conceding that some truths are unknowable.
The proof of the theorem is based on the two following arguments that hold in
any minimal modal system.
First argument:
(1) p ∧¬K p instance of Non-Om
(2) (p ∧¬K p)→♦K (p ∧¬K p) substitution of “ p ∧¬K p” for p in KP
(3) ♦K (p ∧¬K p) from (1) and (2) and Modus Ponens
Second independent argument:
(4) K(p∧¬K p) assumption
(5) (K p∧K¬K p) distributivity of K
(6) (K p∧¬K p) factivity of K
(7) ⊥ contradiction
(8) ¬(K (p∧¬K p)) reductio, discarging (4)
(9) 2¬(K (p∧¬K p)) (Nec)
(10) ¬♦(K (p∧¬K p)) (ER)
From (3) and (10) a contradiction follows. The result of the paradox can be sum-
marized in the following theorem:
(T1) ∃q(q∧¬Kq)→¬∀q(q→♦Kq)
Furthermore, notice also that the converse of (T1) can be easily demonstrated; in
fact, by the principle that what is actual is possible, we obtain the theorem:
(T2) ∀q(q→ Kq)→∀q(q→♦Kq).
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which is provably equivalent to the theorem:
(T3) ¬∀q(q→♦Kq)→∃q(q∧¬Kq)
(T1) and (T3) validate the following theorem:
(T) ∃q(q∧¬Kq)↔¬∀q(q→♦Kq)).
If (T) is a theorem, by applying the Rule of Necessitation to (T), we obtain:
(TN) 2(∃q(q∧¬Kq)↔¬∀q(q→♦Kq)).
Now, notice that (Non-Om) ∃p(p∧¬K p) – the non-omniscience thesis – is the
result of a commonsensical observation according to which, de facto, actually there
are true propositions that we do not know. It is not a logical principle of the paradox,
nor it is introduced through a logical argument.
3 The revision of the logical framework: on the Intuitionistic
Solution to the Knowability Paradox
Different ways to block the knowability paradox have been proposed. They are usu-
ally grouped into three main categories:
• Restriction of the possible instances of KP.
• Reformulation of the formalization of the knowability principle.
• Revision of the logical framework in which the derivation is made.
As mentioned, we only concentrate on the last set of proposals, specifically on
the intuitionistic proposal of revising the logical framework. Intuitionistic logic is
considered as the right logic in an antirealistic conception of truth, a conception em-
bracing an epistemic point of view on truth. A version of this epistemic conception,
compatible with intuitionism, is the following one:
(A) A is true if and only if it is possible to exibit a direct justification for A.
If a justification is something connected to our linguistic capacities, namely not
transcending our epistemic capacities, an antirealist can infer that:
(B) If it is possible to exhibit a direct justification for A, then it is possible to
know that A.
Putting (A) and (B) together we get the knowability principle:
(KP) If A is true, then it is possible to know that A.
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But, as said, from KP, every sentence turns out to be known. Supporters of an
intuitionistic solution to the knowability paradox argue that
(KP) If A is true, then it is possible to know that A.
can be weakened and formulated as a valid intuitionistic formula:
(KPI) ∀p(p→¬¬K p)
obtaining in this way a formula blocking the paradox (Williamson 1982). Indeed,
consider the conclusion of the paradox, i.e.:
¬∃p(p∧¬K p).
From the conclusion we may intuitionistically derive
∀p¬(p∧¬K p).
But if the double negation is not eliminated, then an instance of the above for-
mula:
¬(p∧¬K p)
does not entail
(p→ K p).
It only entails (KPI). An anti-realist is ready to accept (KPI), provided that the
logical constants are understood in accordance with intuitionistic rather than classi-
cal logic. Following Dummett (2009), an anti-realist will prefer (KPI) to (KP) as a
formalization of his view concerning the relation of truth to knowledge.
4 Difficulties in the Intuitionistic Solution to the Knowability
Paradox
There are two connected difficulties regarding the intuitionistic revision of the logic
for the treatment of the knowability paradox.
Firstly, according to Dummett (2009), the consequent of KPI means, from an
intuitionistic point of view, that “there is an obstacle in principle to our being able to
deny that p will ever be known”, or, in other words “the possibility that p will come
to be known always remains open”. From an anti-realistic point of view, the last
claim holds good for every propositions p. In Dummett’s opinion this is what (KPI)
expresses. Observe that anti-realists (or justificationists) do not deny that there are
true proposition that in fact will never be known,
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... But that there are true propositions that are intrinsically unknowable: for instance one
stating the exact mass in grams, given by a real number, of the spanner I am holding in my
hand. (Dummett 2009, p. 52)
Now, although intrinsically unknowable propositions are difficult to be thought,
one may consider the following sentence due to Arthur Pap (1962) as a possible ob-
jection to Dummett’s thesis (a similar sentence can be found in Poincare´’s works1):
Every body in the universe, including our measuring rods, is constantly expanding, the rate
of expansion being exactly the same for all bodies” (p. 37)2.
Pap’s sentence is not verifiable, even if it has a definite truth-condition; namely
we know how the world should be in order to make the sentence true. This point was
also envisaged by Russell (in Schilpp 1951)3. If we accept such analysis of Pap’s
sentence we obtain a case where it does not happen that it is possible to known a
certain sentence p, even if we know its truth-conditions.
Let us focus on the intuitionistic revision proposed by Dummett (2009) and
Williamson (1982). Is their solution satisfactory? Marton (2006, p. 86) observes that
to answer this question, one should notice that any verificationist theory should in-
clude empirical propositions. So, Marton reformulates the question in the following
way:
Can Williamson’s solution be extended to empirical propositions? This is certainly a highly
problematic question, as Williamson repeatedly emphasized (e.g., 1994, 135-137), the in-
tuitionistic approach to the paradox can only work if the intuitionistic semantics is also
granted. No such generally accepted semantics of empirical propositions seems to be avail-
able, however.
This same fact was already pointed out by Prawitz (2002) when he observed that
the serious obstacles to the project of generalizing a verificationist theory to em-
pirical discourse concern sentences for which there are no conclusive verifications
(2002, p. 90). Thus, if knowability is an essential feature of the antirealist paradigm
in philosophy, when applying antirealist theses to empirical sentences, things be-
come at least complex. Mathematical truths are necessary, while empirical truths
can be contingent and this is considered a problem for the antirealist thesis, since
empirical sentences can hardly be proven conclusively, and sometimes not just de
facto but because they are intrinsically unknowable 4. Thus, it seems that the an-
1 See (Poincare´ 1914), section II.1.
2 An interesting analysis of the issue can be found in Dalla Pozza (2008).
3 “My argument for the law of excluded middle and against the definition of “truth” in terms of
“verifiability” is not that it is impossible to construct a system on this basis, but rather that it is
possible to construct a system on the opposite basis, and that this wider system, which embraces
unverifiable truths, is necessary for the interpretation of beliefs which none of us, if we were
sincere, are prepared to abandon” (p. 682).
4 Dag Prawitz (2012) points out that empirical and mathematical assertions can be justified by
means of different grounds. He remarks that “a ground for the assertion of a numerical identity
would be obtained by making a certain calculation, and outside of mathematics, a ground for
asserting an observational sentence would be got by making an adequate observation”. Dummett
(2004), in fact, points out that: “The intuitionist theory of meaning applies only to mathematical
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tirealist notion of truth cannot be easily associated with knowability in the case of
empirical statements, since empirical sentences may be not decidable5.
A second problem for the antirealist concerns undecidedness: a stronger knowa-
bility paradox named undecidedness paradox is derivable from the intuitionistic re-
vision. Percival (1990) argues that the intuitionistic revision of the paradox involves
a further paradox stating that there are no necessary undecided statements, which
seems absurd also from the verificationist perspective. Consider the assumption that
there are undecided statements in the intuitionistic and epistemic calculus:
(1) ∃p(¬K p∧¬K¬p) Assumption (undecidedness)
(2) (¬K p∧¬K¬p) from (1); instantiation
(3) ∀p(¬K p→¬p) intuitionistically equivalent
to the denial of Non-Om
(4) (¬K p→¬p) instantiation of (3)
(5) (¬K¬p→¬¬p) substitution of p with ¬p
(6) ¬p∧¬¬p contradiction from (2), (4) and (5)
(7) ¬∃p(¬K p∧¬K¬p) from (1) and (6)
In the above argument an intuitionistic contradiction follows. Thus, the antire-
alist using intuitionistic logic cannot hold that there are undecided statements and
this seems absurd. A possible way to escape the conclusion is to use Williamson’s
strategy by formalizing undecidedness as:
¬∀p(K p∨K¬p).
The above is classically, but not intuitionistically, equivalent to (1). So, it is only
classically, but not intuitionistically, inconsistent with the result at line (6).
Has the logic of pragmatics LP some good points when handling the above prob-
lems?
5 An outline of the Logic for Pragmatics LP
Dalla Pozza & Garola in 1995 proposed a pragmatic interpretation of intuitionistic
propositional logic as a logic of assertions. They were mainly inspired by the logics
of Frege and Dummett and by Austin’s theory of illocutory acts.
statements, whereas a justificationist theory is intended to apply to the language as a whole. The
fundamental difference between the two lies in the fact that, whereas a means of deciding a range
of mathematical statements, or any other effective mathematical procedure, if available at all, is
permanently available, the opportunity to decide whether or not an empirical statement holds good
may be lost: what can be effectively decided now will no longer be effectively decidable next year,
nor, perhaps, next week” (p. 42).
5 See also Hand (2010).
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Roughly speaking, the idea is to follow Frege distinguishing propositions from
judgements. To briefly recapitulate Frege’s distinction: the proposition has a truth
value, while a judgement is the acknowledgement of the truth by a proposition.
Propositions can be either true or false, while the act of judgement can be expressed
through an act of assertion, which can be justified (hereafter “J”) or unjustified
(hereafter “U”).
The idea of a pragmatic analysis of sentences/propositions has been developed by
Reichenbach (1947). Following Frege and Reichenbach, in Dalla Pozza and Garola
the assertion sign ` consists of two parts: the horizontal stroke is a sign showing that
the content is judgeable, the vertical stroke is a sign showing that the propositional
content is asserted 6. Differently from Frege’s logical system, where assertive sen-
tences cannot be nested, in Dalla Pozza and Garola’s system pragmatic connectives
are introduced to build complex formulas out of expressions of assertion.
Moreover, following Reichenbach’s observations on assertions, i.e. that (i) asser-
tions are part of the pragmatic aspects of language and (ii) assertions cannot be con-
nected with truth-functional operators, in LP there are two sets of formulas: radical
and sentential formulas. Every sentential formula contains at least a radical formula
as a proper subformula. Radical formulas are semantically interpreted by assigning
them with a (classical) truth value, while sentential formulas are pragmatically eval-
uated by assigning them a justification value (J, U), defined in terms of the intuitive
notion of proof. Assertive connectives have a meaning which is explicated by the
BHK (Brouwer, Heyting, Kolmogorov) intended interpretation of logical constants.
Namely, atomic formulas are justified by a proof, while the justification of an impli-
cation is a method transforming a justification of the antecedent into a justification
of the consequent, and so on.
The pragmatic language LP is the union of the set of radical formulas RAD and
the set of sentential formulas SENT, which can be recursively defined:
RAD γ :: = p; ¬γ; γ1∧ γ2; γ1∨ γ2; γ1→ γ2; γ1↔ γ2.
SENT (i) atomic assertive: η :: = ` γ
(ii) Assertive δ :: = η ; ∼ δ ; δ1∩δ2; δ1∪δ2; δ1 ⊃ δ2; δ1 ≡ δ2.
As proved by Dalla Pozza & Garola (1995), classical logic is expressed in LP
by means of those valid pragmatic assertions that are elementary (i.e., the senten-
tial formulas that do not include pragmatic connectives). This classical fragment
is called (CLP). In this way, the corresponding radical formulas are tautological
molecular expressions. On the other hand, intuitionistic logic is obtained by limit-
ing the language of LP to complex formulas that are valid with atomic radical, even
if the metalanguage is still classical. This intuitionistic fragment is called ILP.
The semantic rules for radical formulas are the usual Tarskian rules that specify
the truth-conditions by means of a semantic assignment-function σ . Let γ1,γ2 be
radical formulas, then:
6 From this perspective, notice that an assertion is a “purely logical entity” independent of the
speaker’s intentions and beliefs.
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• (i) σ(¬γ1) = 1 iff σ(γ1) = 0
• (ii) σ(γ1∧ γ2) = 1 iff σ(γ1) = 1 and σ(γ2) = 1
• (iii) σ(γ1∨ γ2) = 1 iff σ(γ1 = 1) or σ(γ2) = 1
• (iv) σ(γ1→ γ2) = 1 iff σ(γ1) = 0 or σ(γ2) = 1
There are also justification rules formalized by the pragmatic evaluation pi gov-
erning the justification-conditions for assertive formulas in function of the σ as-
signments of truth-values for the radical atomic formulas (namely, pi depends on the
semantic function σ for radical atomic formulas). A pragmatic evaluation function
is such that
pi : δ ∈ EN 7−→pi δ ∈ {J,U}
Proposition 1. Let γ be a radical formula. Then, pi(` γ) = J iff there is a proof that
γ is true, i.e. σ assigns to γ the value “true”. Hence, pi(` γ) =U iff no proof exists
that γ is true.
Proposition 2. Let δ be a sentential formula. Then, pi(∼ δ ) = J iff a proof exists
that δ is unjustified, namely that pi(δ ) =U.
Proposition 3. Let δ1, δ2 be sentential formulas, then:
• pi(δ1∩δ2) = J iff pi(δ1) = J and (δ2) = J
• pi(δ1∪δ2) = J iff pi(δ1) = J or (δ2) = J
• pi(δ1 ⊃ δ2) = J iff a proof exists that pi(δ2) = J whenever (δ1) = J
• pi(δ1 ≡ δ2)) = J iff pi(δ1 ⊃ δ2) = J and pi(δ2 ⊃ δ2) = J
Proposition 4. Let γ ∈ RAD. If pi(` γ) = J then σ(γ) = 1
Modus Ponens rule is provided for both (CLP) and ILP, respectively
[MPP] If ` γ1,` γ1 → γ2 then ` γ2
and
[MPP’] If δ1,δ1 ⊃ δ2 then δ2
where δ1 and δ2 contain only atomic radicals. Moreover, note that the justifica-
tion rules do not always allow for the determination of the justification value of a
complex sentential formula when all the justification values of its components are
known. For instance, pi(δ ) = J implies pi(∼ δ ) =U , while pi(δ ) =U does not nec-
essary imply pi(∼ δ ) = J.
In addition, a formula δ is pragmatically valid or p.valid (respectively invalid
or p.invalid) if for every pi and σ , the formula δ = J (respectively δ = U). Note
that if δ is p.valid, then ∼ δ is p.invalid and if ∼ δ is p.valid then δ is p.invalid.
This is the criterion of validity for the pragmatic negation. We insert them just for
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completeness of exposition but we will not make use of them here, the same as for
other pragmatic criteria of validity presented in (Dalla Pozza and Garola 1995).
Hence, no principle analogous to the truth-functionality principle for classical
connectives holds for the pragmatic connectives in LP, since pragmatic connectives
are partial functions of justification.
The set of radical formulas correspond to propositional formulas of classical
logic, while the set of sentential formulas is obtained by applying the sign of as-
sertion ` to radical formulas. An assertion is justified by means of a proof and it
cannot be iterated: so `` γ is not a wff of LP. Nonetheless ` 2γ , with 2 in a S4
modality, is a wff of an extended pragmatic language with modal operators in the
radical formulas. We will follow this suggestion when we will introduce the modal
and epistemic operators in the intuitionistic fragment of LP. This fragment ILP is
obtained limiting LP to complex formula valid with radical atomic formula. The
axiom of ILP are:
A1. δ1 ⊃ (δ2 ⊃ δ1)
A2. (δ1 ⊃ δ2)⊃ ((δ1 ⊃ (δ2 ⊃ δ3))⊃ (δ1 ⊃ δ2))
A3. δ1 ⊃ (δ2 ⊃ (δ1∩δ2))
A4. (δ1∩δ2)⊃ δ1; (δ1∩δ2)⊃ δ2
A5. δ1 ⊃ (δ1∪δ2);δ2 ⊃ (δ1∪δ2)
A6. (δ1 ⊃ δ3)⊃ (δ2 ⊃ δ3)⊃ (δ1∪δ2)⊃ δ3))
A7. (δ1 ⊃ δ2)⊃ ((δ1 ⊃ (∼ δ2))⊃ (∼ δ1))
A8. δ1 ⊃ ((∼ δ1)⊃ δ2)
The assertion sign is not a predicate and asserted sentences cannot be embed-
ded, for instance, in the antecedent of an implication. As observed, this is a classical
feature of assertion and it is what Geach (1965) calls Frege’s point. Moreover, an as-
sertion sign cannot be within the scope of a classical (truth conditional) connective,
since it works in what is called “pragmatic capacity” (Reichenbach 1947).
Sentential formulas have an intuitionistic-like behaviour and can be translated
into modal system S4, where ` γ can be translated as 2γ , meaning that “there is an
(intuitive) proof of the truth of γ” in the sense of empirical or logical procedures of
proof.
Briefly put, the modal meaning of pragmatic assertions is provided by the fol-
lowing semantic translation of pragmatic connectives. Sentential formulas can be
translated into the classical modal system S4 as in the following table:
(` γ) / 2γ
∼` γ / 2¬2γ
(` γ1∩ ` γ2) / 2(γ1)∧2(γ2)
(` γ1∪ ` γ2) / 2(γ1)∨2(γ2)
(` γ1 ⊃ ` γ2) / 2(2(γ1)→2(γ2))
Classical and intuitionistic formulas are related by means of the following
“bridge principles”:
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• (a.) ` (¬γ)⊃∼` (γ)
• (b.) (` γ1∩ ` γ2) ≡ ` (γ1∧ γ2)
• (c.) (` γ1∪ ` γ2) ⊃ ` (γ1∨ γ2)
• (d.) (` γ1→ γ2) ⊃ (` γ1 ⊃ ` γ2)
The formula (a.) states that from the assertion of not-γ , the non-assertability of
γ can be inferred. (b.) states that the conjunction of two assertions is equivalent to
the assertion of a conjunction; (c.) states that from the disjunction of two assertions
one can infer the assertion of a disjunction. Finally ( d.) expresses the idea that from
the assertion of a classical material implication follows the pragmatic implication
between two assertions. Note that such principles hold in an extension of ILP with
classical connectives. We name such fragment ILP+.
6 A Pragmatic Treatment of the Knowability Paradox
Let us present the Knowability Paradox in the framework of ILP enriched with a
knoweldge operator K and aletheic modality. Notice that such a logic cannot be
ILP or ILP+ because, as mentioned, intuitionistic logic is obtained by limiting the
language of LP to complex formulas that are valid with atomic radical, even if the
metalanguage is still classical. Given the above characterization of ILP, the formula
` ♦K p is not a wff of ILP. We extend ILP with a knoweldge operator K and modal-
ity. Concerning modality: we have already observed that ` 2γ , with 2 in an S4
modality, is a wff of an extended pragmatic language with modal operators in the
radical formulas. Regarding the knowledge operator K: it is possible to treat it us-
ing some analogous invariance principles given by Ranalter in (2008) for the ought
operator. 7 Moreover, for the sake of simplicity we will not make use of quantifiers.
We start with a suitable formulation of the Knowability Principle in KILP:
(KP’): (` p⊃` ♦K p). (instance of knowability in KILP)
(KP’) is a wff of KILP and states that there exists a method transforming a proof
of p into a proof of the possibility of knowledge that p, which is a stronger claim
with respect to (KP), i.e. “for every p, p →♦K p”. In (KP’) one claims that there
is a proof of the knowability of p. The principle of non-omniscience in KILP is –
again – stronger than (Non-Om), namely:
(Non-Om’): ` p ∩ ∼ ` K p (instance of Non-Omniscience in KILP).
(Non-Om’) states that there is a proof of p without knowing to know that p.
If so, Non-Om’ says something different form the fact it should express: i.e. non-
omniscience.
7 A similar intermediate logic has been developed in Bellin and Biasi (2004).
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Observe that the arguments leading to the knowability paradox cannot be formu-
lated in KILP, first of all for syntactic reasons. Let us consider the first argument:
(1’) ` p ∩ ∼ ` K p
the substitution of “p” with “p ∧¬K p” cannot be executed, since formulas with clas-
sical connectives are not wff of KILP. Again, the substitution of the radical formula
“p” with “` p ∩∼ `K p” in (KP’) does not work, since the sign of assertion cannot
be nested. Moreover, from the substitution “` p” with “` p ∩ ∼ ` K p” in (KP’), it
merely follows:
(2’) (` p ∩ ∼` K p) ⊃ ` ♦K p
(3’) ` ♦K p modus ponens from (i’) and (ii’).
Let us now consider the second independent argument of the paradox. It is worth
noting that it is impossible to state the assumption for the reductio in KILP; namely
both
(4*) ` K (p∧¬K p)
(4**) ` K(` p ∩ ∼` K p)
are not wff of KILP, since (4*) contains classical connectives, while in (4**) the
sign of assertion is nested. Moreover, consider a semantic reading of (4*): there is a
proof that we know that p is true and that we do not know that p is true. It does not
make any sense! Hence, there is no way to reproduce the paradox in the language
of KILP. Consequently, the argument leading to the paradox is stopped at the early
inferential steps.
7 A Comparison with the Intuitionistic Solution
One could argue that the result just obtained in KILP is not surprising if KILP is
an adequate extended fragment of intuitionistic logic. We have argued that in the
intuitionistic solution (KP) can be weakened and formulated as a valid intuitionistic
formula. Does KILP has any chances to supersede the antirealist difficulties skected
in the paper, in Sec. 4? First, consider a preliminary remark. Observe that, differently
from intuitionism, in KILP:
(A) A is true if and only if it is possible to exibit a direct justification for A
does not hold.
Indeed, for an antirealist truth is epistemically constrained, while subscribers of
LP hold that what can be properly justified in LP are (assertive) acts, and proposi-
tions can be true or false. Notice, moreover, that the use of logical constants in the
metalanguage of KILP is classical. That is why (A) is false in LP. In LP we have to
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distinguish a semantic and a pragmatic level. From the fact that a certain sentance
is true it does not mean that the same sentence is justified. If (A) is false in LP then
KP does not follow. In fact, KP is the result of:
(A) A is true if and only if it is possible to exibit a direct justification for A.
and
(B) If it is possible to exhibit a direct justication for A, then it is possible to know
that A.
As already been mentioned, in putting (A) and (B) together, we get the knowa-
bility principle:
(KP) If A is true, then it is possible to know that A.
This result is in accordance with the syntactic translation given above: In KP’ we
have observed that we have a proof of the knowability of p whereas in KP we just
claim its knowability. If KP’ holds then KP holds but not vice versa.
Consider what happens in KILP with undecidedness.
First, observe that the argument leading to the paradox of undecidedness cannot
be replicated in KILP, since we cannot even express an instance of undecidedness:
Merely from a syntactical point of view
(∼` K p ∩ ∼` K¬p)
is not, in fact, a wff of KILP. A slightly different notion of undecidedness can be
expressed by the formula:
there is a p such that ∼ (` K p ∪ ∼` K p)
namely, there is a p such that it is not provable that the assertion of K p holds or that
the assertion K p does not hold. Let us consider the formula
there is a p such that (` p ∩ ∼` K p)
which expresses non-omniscience in KILP. An instance of the denial of non-
omniscience can be now expressed in the following way:
(0) ∼ (` p ∩ ∼` K p) negation of an instance of (Non-Om’).
Observe that, also with the above version of undecidenss plus Non-Om’ the ar-
gument leading to the Undecidedness Paradox of Knowability cannot be expressed
in KILP. In fact, let us consider the following steps:
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(1) ∼ (` K p∪ ∼` K p) assumption (instance of undecidedness)
(2) (∼` K p⊃∼` p) equivalent to (0)
(3*) (∼` K¬p⊃∼` ¬p) substitution of “p” with “¬p” not
allowed in KILP
(1) can be assumed in order to express a stronger form of undecidability, under-
stood as a the existence of a proof of the impossibility of obtaining decidability.
Notice that the negation of the excluded middle is a contraddiction in intuitionis-
tic logic, whereas the justification value of (1) might be undeterminate in KILP,
according to the justification rules of ILP expanded to KILP. Indeed, there is a for-
mal equivalence only among theorems of intuisionistic logic and the corresponding
p.valid formula of ILP (expanded in the obvious way to KILP), while it does not
follow for formulas different from theorems.
(2) can be derived and a reading of (2) – suggested by the BHK interpretation
of logical constants – is the following one: there is a method which transforms a
proof that Kp cannot be proven into a proof that p cannot be proven. While a clas-
sical reading of (2), namely ¬K p→ ¬p, means that ignorance entails falsity, the
pragmatic reading of (2) deals with the conditions of provability of K. Finally, (3*)
cannot be obtained in KILP, since it is not possible to substitute “ p” with “¬p” (the
negation is classical).
Perhaps, if one wants to express undecidedness by means of conjunction as in
the original paradox, the following might do. Consider the undecidedness paradox
of knowability expressed in an extension of KILP with classical negation. We name
it KILP+. In KILP+, undecidedness can be expressed with
there is a p such that (∼` K p∩ ∼` K¬p).
Consider the following steps:
(1)’ ∼` K p∩ ∼` K¬p assumption (instance of undecidedness)
(2)’ (∼` K p⊃∼` p) equivalent to (0)
(3)’ (∼` K¬p⊃∼` ¬p) substitution of “ p” with “¬p” allowed in KILP+
(4)’ ∼` p ∩ ∼ ` ¬p application of the conjuncts of (1)’ to (2)’and (3)’
Notice that (4)’ does not involve a paradoxical consequence. The fact that we do
not have a proof of p, but also we do not have a proof of ¬p is rather common for
empirical sentences which are not decidable.
Unlike the treatment of the undecidedness paradox of knowability in intuition-
istic logic, KILP in its extension KILP+ does not involve the denial of undecided
sentences. So one could argue either that the paradox is not formalizable in KILP
or that it is not paradoxical in one extension (KILP+) of it. This seems to be an
advantange of KILP over intuitionistic logic.
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8 Conclusions
In this paper paper we have analysed the paradox of knowability asking if it is
reproducible within a logic for pragmatics (LP), especially in an extension of an in-
tuitionistic fragment of it, KILP. We have shown the strict limits of the proposal, but
also some advantages: the most important one concerns undecideness of contingent
sentences.
Notice that the negation of a sentence in intuitionistic logic means that the propo-
sition implies the absurd and this makes sense in mathematics, while – pretheoreti-
cally – the negation of a contingent empirical proposition does not imply the absurd.
On the contrary, the pragmatic negation means that there is a proof that a certain
proposition is not (or cannot be) proved. The formal behaviour of the pragmatic
negation can be properly understood when one take into consideration the excluded
middle. It can be written as (` p∪∼` p). p is an atomic formula atomic and it allows
only an empirical procedure of proof; the following situation is possible: we do not
have an empirical proof procedure for asserting p and we do not have any empirical
procedure of proof for not asserting p. Therefore, (` p∪ ∼` p) is not justified (see
Proposition 3. (ii)).
This property of the pragmatic negation combined with the possibility to express
empirical procedures of proof in the language of LP shows some possible advan-
tanges with respect to intuitionistic logic when dealing with empirical sentences.
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